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INTRODUCTION
When a business signs an employment contract with a new em-
ployee neither party expects to sue the other.  Nevertheless, both par-
ties typically look through the contract to ensure their legal rights are
protected.  Many employment contracts include a clause waiving both
1. Andrew Gray is an associate in the Austin, Texas office of Littler Mendelson, P.C.  He
holds a B.A. from the University of Texas at Austin, and a J.D. from the University of Texas
School of Law.  The author thanks Professor Patrick Woolley for his guidance while writing this
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this Article for publication.
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parties’ rights to a jury trial.2  Typically, the rationale is “if we sue, we
want the issues to be adjudicated quickly, efficiently, and without
much publicity.”  This clause is called a contractual jury-trial waiver.
Employers use this clause, because they believe the notorious unpre-
dictability of juries presents an unacceptable risk.3  Indeed, even the
Supreme Court has recognized civil juries are susceptible to
“[a]rbitrariness, caprice, passion, bias, and even malice,” which can
“replace reasoned judgment and law.”4  A waiver agreement of this
kind requires each party, when suing the other in court, to adjudicate
their claims in a bench trial to avoid a jury they think might be unrea-
sonable.  But because one of the parties may conclude a jury presents
a better ear for their dispute, the enforceability of a jury-trial waiver
may become an issue.
To test the validity of a contractual jury-trial waiver a plaintiff must
first make a demand for a jury trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 38.5  The judge is then presented with a motion to adjudi-
cate the validity of the contractual jury-trial waiver.6  Yet, the issue is
rarely straightforward.
A contractual jury-trial waiver can waive a party’s rights under the
Seventh Amendment, which guarantees the availability of a jury trial
in federal court for most civil lawsuits.7  But jury-trial waivers are not
the only contractual provision that can waive a constitutional right.
2. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Contractual Jury Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, 92
A.L.R. FED. 688 (1989 & Supp. 2007–2008); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Contractual Jury Waivers
in State Civil Cases, 42 A.L.R. 5th 53 (1996 & Supp. 2007).
3. See Chad Shultz, The Jury’s Still Out - Way Out: Subtracting the Jury From the Equation
Decreases Uncertainty in Employment Cases, 50 HR MAG., Jan. 2005 (“In Las Vegas, the odds
may be against you, but at least they are consistent.  Jury trials, by contrast, are notoriously
unpredictable.  Whenever you face a jury trial, you face ever-changing odds that make it difficult
to assess the wisdom of a decision to continue or settle.”).
4. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 474 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (“But jurors are not infallible guardians of the public good.  They are ordinary citizens
whose decisions can be shaped by influences impermissible of our system of justice.  In fact, they
are much more susceptible to such influence than judges.”).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 38.
6. The most common method of presenting a jury-trial waiver is through a motion to strike
the demand for a jury trial, made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39, although other
procedural methods of presenting the issue exist. See Jarod S. Gonzalez, A Tale of Two Waivers:
Waiver of the Jury Waiver Defense Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 87 NEB. L. REV.
675 (outlining how a jury-trial waiver can be presented within the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  The Constitution reads:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law.
Id.
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Similarly, arbitration agreements and forum-selection clauses8 can
constitute a waiver of these rights.  These three clauses accomplish the
same goal: altering a party’s means of dispute resolution.  However,
courts have held each to a different standard of enforcement.  There is
no sound reason for the difference.  This inconsistency in the law
causes confusion, inefficiency, and unnecessary expense for the courts
as well as the parties in the litigation.
A contractual jury-trial waiver agreement, sometimes referred to as
a bench-trial clause, is subject to different standards in courts through-
out the United States.9  Federal courts have endorsed three competing
views on how to determine the validity of such a waiver.  In most fed-
eral courts a waiver agreement is held to a “knowing and voluntary”
standard.10  Like a criminal defendant’s Miranda rights, a party’s
waiver of the right to a jury trial must be made knowingly and volun-
tarily.11  In most courts using this standard the burden of proving a
“knowing and voluntary” waiver will be placed on the waiver’s propo-
nent.12  Conversely, in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the party
that opposes the jury-trial waiver bears the burden of proving the
waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily made.13
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a
very different approach.14  The rationale underlying most circuits’
methods for determining the validity of jury-trial waivers is based
upon waivers of other constitutional rights.15  However, the Seventh
Note, however, that the Seventh Amendment only provides the right to a jury trial in suits “at
common law.”  Courts generally interpret the Seventh Amendment to provide a jury-trial right
only in cases arising at law, as opposed to cases arising in equity. See Feltner v. Columbia Pic-
tures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–48 (1998) (discussing cases in which the right to a jury
trial applies).
8. While forum selection clauses can be either permissive (an agreement to allow suit in a
particular venue without attempting to bar suit elsewhere) or mandatory (mandating suit be
brought in a particular venue), this Article discusses forum selection in the context of mandatory
clauses only.  For more on this distinction, see generally Stephen E. Sachs, The Forum Selection
Defense, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2014) (outlining different types of forum
selection clauses).
9. E.g., IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 991 (7th
Cir. 2008) (referring to the waiver as a “bench-trial clause”).
10. See 38 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 38.52(3)(a) (3d. ed. 2007) (listing cases).
11. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“The defendant may waive effectuation of [his Miranda rights], pro-
vided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”).
12. See, e.g., RDO Fin. Services Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002)
(outlining the burden of proof in waiving the right to a jury trial).
13. K.M.C. Co., Inc., v. Irving Trust Company, 757 F. Supp. 2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1984).
14. See IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989 (7th Cir.
2008).
15. Id. at 994–95.
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Circuit based its rationale on an analogy to the enforceability of arbi-
tration agreements.16  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit enforces jury-
trial waiver agreements the same way it enforces arbitration clauses
within contracts.17
The views advanced within this circuit split are each inherently
flawed.18  The Seventh Circuit, breaking from established law, ignores
the fact that arbitration agreements are governed by the Federal Arbi-
tration Act.19  Other circuits fail to articulate why jury-trial waivers
should be held to such a strict standard, while other important consti-
tutional rights are waived more easily.  The “knowing and voluntary”
standard advanced in most circuits stems from inaccurate applications
of both precedent and the Seventh Amendment.
This Article proposes a new solution: jury-trial waivers should be
enforced similarly to forum-selection clauses.  This change would ac-
complish two things: (1) eliminate an inconsistency in the law sur-
rounding enforcement of jury-trial waivers, arbitration agreements,
and forum-selection clauses and (2) provide an efficient, clear, and
inexpensive method for adjudicating disputes involving jury-trial waiv-
ers.  As Professor Ware20 argues, “[i]f the law governing jury-waiver
clauses is the only major body of law regularly applying knowing-con-
sent standards to civil waivers of constitutional rights, then perhaps it
is the area of law that should change.”21
This Article argues that the current treatment of contractual jury-
trial waivers is improper and proposes a new standard for enforcing
such waivers.  Federal courts, currently analogizing these waivers to
the waiver of Miranda rights or to clauses requiring arbitration, would
be better served using the standard for enforcing forum-selection
clauses.  Part I of this Article explains the history of the contractual
jury-trial waiver and compares it to how arbitration and forum-selec-
tion clauses are enforced.  This Article then explains why a party
might choose one over the other.  Part II describes the three standards
courts currently use to enforce contractual jury-trial waivers.  Part III
explains the inherent problems with the current standards.  It then dis-
cusses how forum-selection clauses relate to contractual jury-trial
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See infra Part III.A (explaining the flaws behind current enforcement standards of jury-
trial waivers).
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
20. Professor Stephen J. Ware is a professor of Law at the University of Kansas, focusing on
judicial selection and alternative dispute resolution.
21. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers
of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 198 (2004).
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waivers22 and why forum-selection clauses provide the best model for
judicial treatment of jury-trial waivers.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CONTRACTUAL JURY-TRIAL WAIVER AND
A COMPARISON TO OTHER CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES.
A. Preference for One Clause Over Another
Why might parties agree to a contractual jury-trial waiver?  Why
might an employer choose to include a contractual jury-trial waiver
within an employment contract in lieu of an arbitration agreement?
An employer will often include some form of alternative dispute reso-
lution within employment contracts to avoid the risk of runaway jury
verdicts.23  Juries, sometimes indifferent to substantive law, may
award plaintiffs millions of dollars in employment suits.24  Employers,
particularly large corporations, often assume a jury will be biased
against them, and more sympathetic to an aggrieved plaintiff.25  Thus,
even with procedural safeguards against bias, such as summary judg-
ment or judgment as a matter of law, an employer may be hesitant to
allow a jury to act as fact-finder.
Arbitration clauses are seldom used between two individual parties,
mainly because of the expense of arbitration.26  Parties are not only
responsible for filing fees, but also the expense of the arbitrator her-
self.27  While the cost of arbitration for an employer will certainly be
22. Although this Article is the first to argue the topic to its full extent, Professor Stephen
Ware first mentioned the idea of harmonizing the law of contractual jury-trial waivers with the
law of forum-selection clauses in 2004 when he wrote:
There is an appeal to harmonizing the law on civil waivers of constitutional rights.  Har-
monization could occur in two ways—either by making jury-waiver cases conform to
arbitration law, property-deprivation cases, forum selection cases, and consent-to juris-
diction cases, or by making these latter cases all conform to jury-waiver cases.
Id. at 205.
23. See David F. Johnson, Arbitration, Forum Selection, and Contractual Jury Waiver Clauses:




24. See, e.g., Settlements and Verdicts, HADSELL STORMER RENICK LLP, http://www.hadsell
stormer.com/Settlements-Verdicts.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (a law firm website advertis-
ing jury verdicts the firm received, typically in the millions of dollars); see also TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 474 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the unrea-
sonableness of a civil jury).
25. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42 A.L.R.
5TH 53, § 2 (1996).
26. See Ozekie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication Doc-
trine in U.S. Arbitration Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 404 (2014) (discussing the expenses
related to arbitration).
27. Johnson, supra note 23. R
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lower than a jury trial, it may be more economical to adjudicate a
claim in a bench trial. Arbitration requires the contracting parties to
agree to procedures and rules, which may differ from those provided
by statute.  Most importantly, there is no avenue for appellate review
within arbitration.28  An arbitrator’s decision is almost impossible to
overturn, regardless of the facts or substantive law surrounding the
issue.29  When deciding how a potential claim should be tried, employ-
ers may favor trying cases in the court system, where appellate courts
can remedy an incorrect application of the law or overturn a decision
based on insufficient evidence.30
When crafting employment contracts, employers weigh the expense
and uncertainty of a jury trial against the expense and finality of an
arbitration proceeding.  A jury-trial waiver arguably provides the best
of both worlds.31  Like arbitration, bench trials can save both time and
money in comparison to jury trials.32  Thus, an employer may prefer a
jury-trial waiver,  perceiving a bench trial as a middle ground between
a jury trial and an arbitration proceeding.
While historical precedent has been inconsistent, modern Supreme
Court decisions favor enforcement of both arbitration clauses and fo-
rum-selection clauses.  This Article argues not only that contractual
jury-trial waivers are in the same family as these two clauses, but that
they can accomplish the same goal.  Arbitration clauses, forum-selec-
tion clauses, and jury-trial waivers are all forms of a waiver.33  Why
28. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Jury Revival or Jury Reviled? When Employees are Com-
pelled to Waiver Jury Trials, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 767, 777–80 (2005) (noting that use of
arbitration in employment disputes is less favored due to, high damages awards and extremely
deferential standard of judicial review—courts cannot determine if an arbitrator misapplied the
fact or the law, and can only review an award on its face).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Chester Chuang, Assigning the Burden of Proof in Contractual Jury Waiver Chal-
lenges: How Valuable is Your Right to a Jury Trial?, 10 EMPL. RTS. & EMPL. POL’Y J. 205, 209–13
(discussing benefits and disadvantages of arbitration agreements versus jury-trial waivers); John-
son, infra note 64, at 650–52 (discussing similarly). R
32. Chuang, supra note 31, at 211 (“Much like arbitration, bench trials offer potentially signifi- R
cant time and cost savings when compared to jury trials.”); Thomas H. Cohen & Steven K.
Smith, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001,
tbls. 2 & 8 (Apr. 2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mmtvlc01.pdf (stating that 77% of
non-jury cases were decided within two years compared to only 56.9% of jury cases.  Jury trials
lasted an average of 4.3 days compared to only 1.9 days for bench trials).
33. See Sachs, supra note 8 (“To start with, forum selection is best understood as a form of R
waiver.”); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Con-
sumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1 WIS. L. REV. 33, 121 (1997) (“The
policy against prospective waivers should bar any express prospective waiver built into an arbi-
tration clause.  But that sort of overreaching upon overreaching should not obscure the degree
to which even a facially-neutral arbitration clause works a prospective waiver of substantive
rights.”).
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then, has the Court refused to grant jury-trial waivers the same defer-
ence as the two others?
B. Arbitration Agreements
The rise of arbitration started in 1925 after Congress passed the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).34  In brief, the FAA allows for courts
to facilitate alternative dispute resolution through arbitration and en-
sures that arbitration agreements are enforced similarly to other con-
tractual provisions.  Despite attacks on the viability and efficacy of the
arbitration process since the FAA’s enactment, the Supreme Court
has consistently held in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses.35
When considering arbitration and its validity as a method for alter-
native dispute resolution, the following five governing principles ap-
ply: (1) courts favor arbitration; (2) arbitration clauses are upheld
without a showing of knowing and intelligent consent; (3) the party
opposing arbitration bears the burden of proof; (4) arbitration can
sometimes be imposed using unsigned envelope “stuffers,” hand-
books, and warranties; and (5) ambiguous contracts are construed
broadly so as to support arbitration.36  These principles are a conse-
quence of the Supreme Court’s continued position in favor of enforc-
ing arbitration clauses,37 most notably in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corporation.38  The Court in Gilmer rejected the argument that
arbitration agreements should not be enforced due to a disparity in
bargaining power.  Specifically, the Court stated:
Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient
reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in
the employment context.  Relationships between securities dealers
and investors, for example, may involve unequal bargaining power,
but we nevertheless held in Rodriguez de Quijas and McMahon that
34. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
35. See, e.g., AT&T Techs. v. Commc’ns. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 653 (1986) (citing
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960)).
The court noted:
[I]n light of the congressional policy making arbitration the favored method of dispute
resolution, such a provision requires arbitration ‘unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute.  Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
Id.
36. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and Demise of the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 673–74 (2001).
37. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal
Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the
states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed
to resolve by arbitration.”).
38. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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agreements to arbitrate in that context are enforceable. . . .  [T]he
FAA’s purpose was to place arbitration agreements on the same
footing as other contracts.  Thus, arbitration agreements are en-
forceable “save upon such grounds as exist in law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”39
Arbitration agreements are favored by courts, and as a result, de-
fenses such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability are used to invali-
date these clauses in only the most egregious cases.  Some courts have
even held that a non-signatory can enforce an arbitration clause or
that a party can enforce an arbitration clause against a non-signa-
tory.40  Under this doctrine, a party cannot ignore an arbitration
agreement in the contract at issue in the lawsuit.
An arbitration clause, however, does more than waive a party’s
right to a jury trial.41  It essentially waives the entire trial.42  Yet, these
clauses have enjoyed long-standing favor within federal courts around
the nation.  In fact, only one case has refused to uphold an arbitration
agreement on Seventh Amendment grounds.43  However, the unpub-
lished opinion was quickly overturned by the Fourth Circuit.44
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has aggressively enforced
arbitration clauses.  Yet while arbitration agreements inherently stem
from forum-selection clauses, each are subject to different standards
of review.45
C. Forum-Selection Clauses
Unlike arbitration agreements, forum-selection clauses in the early
20th century were not favored by federal courts.46  Many courts have
historically declined to enforce contractual forum-selection clauses
39. Id. at 33.
40. See, e.g., Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A. 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir.
1999) (binding non-signatory to a contract under which it received direct benefits of lower insur-
ance and the ability to sail under the French flag).
41. Chuang, supra note 31, at 231 n.146 (“[A]n agreement to arbitrate includes a waiver of R
jury trial rights.”).
42. See, e.g., Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 268, 270 (S.D. Miss. 1989)
(holding that the implicit waiver of a jury trial in an arbitration agreement constitutes a waiver of
the entire litigation process in the judicial system).
43. Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 252 F.3d 302, 304 (4th Cir. 2001) (referencing the
bench opinion of the trial court by stating that “Judge Richard L. Williams denied Conseco’s
motion to compel arbitration. As basis for his ruling, Judge Williams found that plaintiffs did not
knowingly and voluntarily waive their right to a jury trial”).
44. Id. at 307.
45. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7–17 (1984) (comparing the Supreme Court’s anal-
ysis of contractual forum-selection clauses with binding arbitration clauses, and discussing the
Court’s view of each).
46. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (“Forum-selection clauses
have historically not been favored by American courts.  Many courts, federal and state, have
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while simultaneously enforcing arbitration agreements.47  But modern
federal courts favor forum-selection clauses, reasoning that such
clauses should be considered prima facie valid.48  When state law is at
issue, the problem becomes even more complex.49
In 1972, the Supreme Court in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co.50 held that contractual forum-selection clauses were enforceable
within federal courts.51  Although The Bremen discussed the issue in
the context of courts sitting in admiralty, its reasoning has been ap-
plied to federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction as well.52  Post-
Bremen, the Supreme Court has strongly favored forum-selection
clauses, holding they are valid except in uncommon, unusual circum-
stances.53  The Court in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas went so far as to
state:
When parties agree to a forum-selection clause, they waive the right
to challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient or less conve-
declined to enforce such clauses on the ground that they were ‘contrary to public policy,’ or that
their effect was to ‘oust the jurisdiction’ of the court.”).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 10.
49. A forum-selection clause which mandates that a claim, which would otherwise be adjudi-
cated in state court, be tried in federal court, the clause presents a significant choice of law issue,
particularly as applied to jury-trial waivers.  While this Article is primarily focused only on fed-
eral law and claims adjudicated in federal court, this issue should not be overlooked.  Indeed,
courts have struggled with the application of state law in forum-selection clauses, and the issue
has been subject to academic review as well. See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 1, 22
(1988) (engaging in a full Erie analysis to determine the applicability of state law claims when
parties agreed to a forum-selection clause); Sachs, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that whether forum- R
selection clauses: are valid— that is, whether they succeed in waiving the rights they purport to
waive—is a question of procedure, not just of contract law.  And as a procedural question, it
depends on the law of the forum: state procedure in state court and federal procedure in federal
court, no matter what law gives rise to the claim. Id.
50. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
51. Id. at 10 (“[A view in federal courts], is that such clauses are prima facie valid and should
be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be “unreasonable” under the
circumstances.  We believe this is the correct doctrine to be followed by federal district courts
sitting in admiralty.”).
52. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 1, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The Court
noted:
[E]nforcement of valid forum-selection clauses, bargained for by the parties, protects
their legitimate expectations and furthers vital interests of the justice system.  Although
our opinion in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., involved a federal district court
sitting in admiralty, its reasoning applies with much force to federal courts sitting in
diversity. The justifications we noted in The Bremen to counter the historical disfavor
forum-selection clauses had received in American courts, should be understood to
guide the District Court’s analysis under § 1404(a).
See also Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 (2013) (af-
firming Justice Kennedy’s assertion in Stewart).
53. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582.
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nient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their pursuit of the
litigation. . . .  As we have explained in a different but instructive
context, “[w]hatever ‘inconvenience’ [the parties] would suffer by
being forced to litigate in the contractual forum as [they] agreed to
do was clearly foreseeable at the time of contracting.” . . . [T]he
practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control except
in unusual cases.  Although it is “conceivable in a particular case”
that the district court “would refuse to transfer a case notwithstand-
ing the counterweight of a forum-selection clause,” such cases will
not be common.54
Later, the Court went on to state:
When parties have contracted in advance to litigate disputes in a
particular forum, courts should not unnecessarily disrupt the par-
ties’ settled expectations.  A forum-selection clause, after all, may
have figured centrally in the parties’ negotiations and may have af-
fected how they set monetary and other contractual terms; it may, in
fact, have been a critical factor in their agreement to do business
together in the first place.  In all but the most unusual cases, there-
fore, “the interest of justice” is served by holding parties to their
bargain.55
In modern federal courts, forum-selection clauses and arbitration
clauses are subject to similar standards.  However, the precise stan-
dard surrounding the enforcement of forum-selection clauses is less
concrete.56  A court will typically hold a forum-selection clause prima
facie valid and will only decline jurisdiction if it is reasonable to do
so.57  A party seeking to avoid the clause has the burden of proving
either the clause will cause undue hardship or that the clause was un-
fairly bargained for.58
54. Id. (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 583.
56. See Sachs, supra note 8 (discussing criticisms of current federal-forum-selection-clause R
standards and the lack of a uniform, codified standard for enforcement).
57. Francis M. Daugherty, Validity of Contractual Provisions Limiting Place or Court in Which
Action May be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404, 2.
[T]he view that such provisions are prima facie valid has been followed in numerous
recent cases. . . . Under this more modern view, the courts treat the contractual provi-
sion not as one which seeks to oust the court of jurisdiction, but rather as a provision
which will allow the court to decline jurisdiction if it is reasonable to do so.  Where no
additional expense is created, the witnesses are available at either location, the party
will not lose his remedy, and the provision was freely bargained for, the courts have
declined jurisdiction and enforced the contract.  On the other hand, where the party
seeking to avoid the clause has satisfied his burden of proof and shown that enforce-
ment of the clause will cause undue hardship or has not been freely bargained for, the
courts have refused to enforce it.
Id.
58. Id.
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D. Contractual Jury-Trial Waivers
In the context of employment disputes, several federal statutes pro-
vide a right to a jury trial, such as the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act59 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.60  For lawsuits
arising under Title VII, the right to a jury trial was not available until
1991.61  Prior to the passage of this law, judges, not juries, acted as
factfinder in most employment discrimination cases—bench trials only
occurred if racial bias was a concern.62  After the change in 1991, the
rate at which employees won these lawsuits skyrocketed due to the
increased use of juries.63
Employers reacted by including one of two provisions in employ-
ment contracts: an arbitration clause or a jury-trial waiver clause.
While arbitration clauses have distinct benefits, jury-trial waivers have
found a prominent niche in employment contracts that has continued
to this day.  An example of such a clause might look like this:
THE PARTIES HEREBY UNCONDITIONALLY WAIVE
THEIR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND ANY AND ALL
CLAIMS OR CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING FROM OR RE-
LATING TO THEIR RELATIONSHIP.  THE PARTIES AC-
KNOWLEDGE THAT A RIGHT TO A JURY IS A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT, THAT THEY HAVE HAD AN
OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL, AND THAT THIS JURY WAIVER HAS BEEN
ENTERED INTO KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY BY
ALL PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT.  IN THE EVENT OF
59. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (2016) (granting jury trial rights under the ADEA).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(1)–(17) (2016).
61. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.); see also Robert Frankhauser, The Enforceability of Pre-Dispute Jury
Waiver Agreements in Employment Discrimination Cases, 8 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 55, 63–64 (2006)
(discussing jury-trial rights in the Civil Rights Act).
62. See 137 Cong. Rec. S15,445-02, S15,452 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Nick-
les) (stating during floor debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that “[w]e have not had jury
trials in Title VII cases before in the private sector”); see also M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of
Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311,
357.  Medina explains the absence of jury trials pre-1991 by stating:
The legislative record for the 1964 Act reveals legislative unease with juries because
they were perceived to be hostile or unfriendly to civil rights claimants.  This was cer-
tainly the case with racial discrimination, plainly the driving force behind the 1964 Act.
It was a fair inference for legislators to make from the response to the federal judiciary-
driven push to desegregate the South, that federal judges would be more receptive to
victims of racial discrimination than primarily white, male juries in the South.
Id.
63. Steven F. Fink, Insist on Bench Trials, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 13, 2003, at A17; Gonzalez, supra
note 6, at 679 (explaining that plaintiffs tended to do better in front of juries than they had in R
front of federal judges, in terms of liability and higher damages awards).
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LITIGATION, THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE FILED AS A
WRITTEN CONSENT TO A TRIAL BY THE COURT.64
Employers will often write such clauses to be as repetitive and com-
prehensive as possible to ensure the clause is enforced.65
Today, federal courts agree that contractual jury-trial waivers are
neither illegal nor contrary to public policy.66  This has not always
been the case.  More than 140 years ago, the Supreme Court decided
Insurance Co. v. Morse,67 which implied that a contract waiving the
right to a jury trial was unenforceable.68  States, which are not bound
by the Seventh Amendment,69 continued allowing the waivers.70  As
time progressed, federal courts began validating jury-trial waivers.  By
the 1960s, jury-trial waivers were not only prevalent, but known to be
generally enforceable.71
Morse has been implicitly overruled by cases such as The Bremen,72
which allow parties to waive their rights through a specifically en-
64. David F. Johnson, The Enforcement of Contractual Jury Waiver Clauses in Texas, 62 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 649, 650 (2010).  This example of a jury-trial waiver clause is repeated here in all-
caps, as formatted in the original work.  This typeface is common in jury-trial waiver agreements,
as courts will refuse to enforce these clauses based upon its conspicuousness in the underlying
contract. See RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 814 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (declin-
ing to enforce a jury-trial waiver clause when the text was not “set off from the rest of the text
through differential bold, larger print, italics, or any other form of emphasis or distinction”).
65. See Bear, Stearns Funding, Inc. v. Interface Grp.-Nev., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82557,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2007) (interpreting a similarly written jury-trial waiver, in the context of
a loan agreement, stating that “[i]t is hard to imagine a more complete, all-encompassing, repeti-
tive waiver of a right to trial by jury.  One is reminded of Lewis Carroll’s The Hunting of the
Snark ‘What I tell you three times is true.’“).
66. MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 10. R
67. 87 U.S. 445 (1874) (recognized as superceded by statute in Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Con-
structors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148 (S.D. Cal. 1993)) (finding that an arbitration clause preempts an
individual’s constitutional right to have his matter heard in federal court, and discussing numer-
ous other cases that also invalidated contracts requiring arbitration).
68. Morse, 87 U.S. at 451.  The Supreme Court held:
A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights. . . . In a
civil case he may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or to
the decision of a single judge. . . . He cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an
agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and
on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.
Id.
69. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875) (“The States, so far as [the Seventh Amendment]
is concerned, are left to regulate trials in their own courts in their own way.”); Gasperini v. Ctr.
for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (citing Walker, 92 U.S. at 92) (“The Seventh Amend-
ment, which governs proceedings in federal court, but not in state court.”).
70. See, e.g., Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 885, 886 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (stating that the California Constitution does not prohibit contractual jury-trial waivers).
71. Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (“Without pausing to explore
the many nuances inherent in varying situations, we observe simply that a jury trial lawfully may
be waived, both before and after a given cause of action shall arise.”).
72. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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forceable contract.  Yet post-Morse, the Supreme Court has never di-
rectly addressed how to enforce contractual jury-trial waivers.  Jury-
trial waivers have been discussed by the Court, but the discussion has
generally been limited to criminal jury-trial waivers, waivers by stat-
ute, or temporary waivers.73  Enforcement of contractual jury-trial
waivers in civil cases has been considered only by lower courts.
Like other waivers of constitutional rights, most courts hold jury-
trial waivers to a strict standard; however, several courts have never
explicitly addressed the issue.74  Like the waiver of a criminal defen-
dant’s Miranda rights, any waiver must be made knowingly and intelli-
gently.75  Similar to the evolution of Miranda rights, modern courts
have become increasingly lenient towards enforcing jury-trial
waivers.76
II. HOW FEDERAL COURTS TREAT THE VALIDITY OF
CONTRACTUAL JURY-TRIAL WAIVERS.
A. The “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard
While the Supreme Court has never endorsed any standard for en-
forcing jury-trial waivers, Courts in almost every circuit court have
addressed the issue in some way.  There are three ways modern fed-
eral courts view contractual jury-trial waivers.  The three views under-
lying this complex circuit split are based upon a reasonable rationale,
but each of these views has serious faults.  Since the jury-trial waiver
has become commonplace, most federal courts have held that a con-
tractual jury-trial waiver is enforceable subject to a “knowing and vol-
untary” standard.77
73. See, e.g., Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 389 (1975) (discussing the waiver of a jury
trial in a criminal context).
74. Crescent Res. Litig. Tr. by & ex rel. Bensimon v. Duke Energy Corp., No. A-12-CA-009-
SS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62676, at *19 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 2013) (stating that the Fifth Circuit
has yet to address the issue).
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (“[A] heavy burden rests on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.”).
76. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 126 (1998) (“Al-
though the Justices are unlikely to overrule Miranda in the foreseeable future, one can say fairly
that the court has retreated from the holding of Miranda in several significant respects.”).
77. Note that some courts view the standard not as requiring a “voluntary and knowing”
waiver, but as requiring that a party “knowingly and intentionally” waiving the right to a jury
trial, or any other variation on the phrase.  However, the difference between these phrases
seems to be nothing more than semantic. See Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832
(4th Cir. 1986) (“The seventh amendment right is of course a fundamental one, but it is one that
can be knowingly and intentionally waived by contract.”) (emphasis added); see also Sternlight,
supra note 36, at 678–79.  Jean Sternlight writes: R
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One of the first courts to articulate this standard was the Second
Circuit in National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Hendrix.78  H. Walter
Hendrix was the proprietor of a small construction company and con-
tracted with two separate companies for the purchase of equipment.79
After realizing that he would be unable to pay for the equipment,
Hendrix contacted National Equipment Rental (NER) to obtain a
loan.  Under the terms of the loan, Hendrix was advanced the cash to
purchase the equipment and paid a monthly fee.80  After Hendrix de-
faulted on the loan, NER brought suit against Hendrix.  The trial
court judge dismissed NER’s motion to strike Hendrix’s demand for a
jury trial.81  On appeal to the Second Circuit, NER cited a jury-trial
waiver clause within the loan contract, which stated, “Lessee hereby
waives a trial by jury.”82
In its analysis, the Hendrix court cited the Seventh Amendment and
explained the presumption against jury-trial waivers.83  In affirming
the denial of NER’s motion, the court proceeded to discuss several
factors to explain why the jury-trial waiver was invalid.84  First, the
court stated that the waiver was “literally buried in the eleventh para-
graph of a fine print, sixteen clause agreement.”85  Second, the court
recognized the gross disparity in bargaining power between NER and
Hendrix.86  Hendrix had little choice but to accept the contract as
written in order to get the money he so badly needed.87  Finally, the
court discussed the business acumen of the parties, addressing NER’s
assertion that Hendrix used the funds for a business purpose, and was
not the “hapless consumer” which these laws were designed to pro-
tect.88  Here, the court stated:
Hendrix was compelled to borrow from NER on NER’s terms to
avoid losing the equity he had in the equipment, the equipment it-
Other federal courts have upheld contractual waivers only when they were “knowing
and intentional,” “knowing, voluntary and intentional,” “knowing, voluntary and intel-
ligent,” “voluntary and intentional,” “knowing and intentional,” “knowing and intelli-
gent,” or “knowing and voluntary.”  The courts have not drawn any distinctions based
on the slight differences in the wording of these phrases.
Id. (citations omitted).
78. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977).
79. Id. at 256.
80. Id. at 257.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 258.





88. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 259.
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self, and his livelihood.  The usury laws were clearly intended to
apply to just such a situation: of a needy individual forced, because
of the creditor’s greater bargaining power, to borrow at oppressive
rates.89
While the Hendrix court may not have intended to create a formal
standard for these issues, subsequent courts have nevertheless fol-
lowed the Hendrix rationale closely.  For example, the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas followed Hendrix in RDO Financial Services v. Powell.90
In RDO, the court specifically stated not only that a valid jury-trial
waiver must be made “knowingly and voluntarily,” but that the court
will “indulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver of [a
party’s Seventh Amendment right].”91  The court then proceeded to
enumerate several factors in determining the “knowing and volun-
tary” requirement, which are strikingly similar to the original analysis
in Hendrix:
(1) whether there was gross disparity in bargaining power between
the parties, (2) the business or professional experience of the party
opposing the waiver, (3) whether the opposing party had an oppor-
tunity to negotiate contract terms, and (4) whether the clause con-
taining the waiver was inconspicuous.92
The RDO court found the jury-trial waiver was written in small
print, “buried in the middle of a lengthy paragraph, not set off from
the rest of the text through differential bold, larger print, italics, or
any other form of emphasis or distinction.”93  The court went on to
note that the waiver was wholly one-sided, in that RDO had the op-
tion of whether to enforce the waiver at its discretion.94  Accordingly,
the court held the jury-trial waiver unenforceable.95
On the other hand, when both parties to the contract are relatively
sophisticated, courts adhering to the “knowing and voluntary” stan-
dard find no problem enforcing a jury-trial waiver, even absent abso-
lute equity in the parties’ bargaining power.96  Courts have also
89. Id.
90. 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 812 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 255) (“[T]he Court
turns to federal law for guidance [in determining the standard of waiving the right to a jury
trial].”).
91. Id. at 813.
92. Id. at 813–14.
93. Id. at 814.
94. Id.
95. RDO Fin. Servs. Co., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
96. See, e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  The
court noted:
[A]lthough there was clearly a difference in bargaining power between the sides — as
there would be between a major bank and virtually any two individuals — the Cranes
were not financial neophytes.  They had established relationships with a number of
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recognized that in a contract between two companies, one company
often has the option to simply walk away from the transaction if a
jury-trial waiver is attached.97
Hendrix has been the leading case for most courts articulating the
“knowing and voluntary” standard.  The Hendrix standard for assess-
ing jury-trial waivers has been adopted in the First,98 Second,99
Fourth,100 Sixth,101 Ninth,102 and Eleventh103 Circuits.
Today, courts applying the Hendrix standard use a list of factors,
similar to those enumerated in RDO.104  Discussing the use of jury-
trial waivers, Moore’s Federal Practice lists the factors courts consider:
Negotiability of contract terms and negotiations between the parties
concerning the waiver provision; conspicuousness of the provision
in the contract; the relative bargaining power of the parties; busi-
ness acumen of the party opposing waiver; whether counsel for the
Morgan officials over approximately one year, and the fact that the Cranes had previ-
ously negotiated changes to agreements made with Morgan further demonstrates their
ability to negotiate with the bank.
Id.
97. See, e.g., Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle v. Chrysler Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 (E.D. La.
1999) (holding that although there was an inequity of bargaining power between the two corpo-
rate parties, this was not enough to void a jury-trial waiver when “[the plaintiffs] have produced
no evidence that they could not have gone elsewhere for financing had they found CFC’s terms
oppressive”).
98. Med. Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002) (“There is a
presumption against denying a jury trial based on waiver, and waivers must be strictly
construed.”).
99. Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 188 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Al-
though the right is fundamental and a presumption exists against its waiver, a contractual waiver
is enforceable if it is made knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily.”).
100. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Where waiver is claimed
under a contract executed before litigation is contemplated, we agree with those courts that have
held that the party seeking enforcement of the waiver must prove that consent was both volun-
tary and informed.”).  Although the Fourth Circuit seems to adopt the Hendrix standard here,
the court left some aspects of their holding ambiguous, which this Article discusses infra note
137. R
101. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Tr. Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Those cases in which the
validity of a contractual waiver of jury trial has been in issue have overwhelmingly applied the
knowing and voluntary standard.”).
102. Cnty. of Orange v. United States Dist. Court, 784 F.3d 520, 531 (9th Cir. 2015) (recogniz-
ing that the “knowing and voluntary” standard is the federal constitutional minimum, but hold-
ing that “federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the relevant state law to evaluate the
validity of a pre-dispute jury trial waiver when that law is more protective than federal law”).
103. Bakrac, Inc. v. Villager Franchise Sys., 164 F. App’x 820, 823 (11th Cir. 2006) (Unpub-
lished table decision) (“A party may validly waive its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial so
long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary.”).
104. See, e.g., Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C., No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110, at 1
(S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2004); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex.
2002); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.P.R. 1996); Dreiling v. Peugeot
Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982).
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party opposing waiver had an opportunity to review the
agreement.105
Most courts consider these factors, but many courts overlook or ex-
pressly decline to address the issue of which party has the burden of
proving the waiver was “knowing and voluntary.”106
B. The Burden of Proof in Jury-Trial Waivers
Determining which party has the burden of proof when enforcing a
jury-trial waiver is a difficult issue that has never been fully re-
solved.107  The circuits are split on how to assign the burden.  The un-
certainty may stem from Hendrix.  While the Hendrix court expressly
stated that a waiver must be “knowing and voluntary,” the court de-
clined to address how this standard was created and how it should be
applied in practice.108  Many courts have blindly cited Hendrix for the
proposition that the burden is on the party seeking enforcement, fail-
ing to recognize that Hendrix does not answer that question.109
The most prominent recognition of the burden of proof issue came
in the Sixth Circuit case of K.M.C. v. Irving Trust.110  K.M.C. and Ir-
ving entered into a financing agreement, whereby K.M.C. was ex-
tended a $3 million line of credit.111  Irving refused to advance the
funds, which caused the collapse of K.M.C.’s business; K.M.C. subse-
quently filed suit.112  The trial court judge ordered a jury trial over
Irving’s objection that the financing agreement included an enforcea-
ble jury-trial waiver.113  The trial court judge based his decision upon
the statement of K.M.C.’s president Leonard Butler.  Butler stated he
was assured by a representative of Irving, prior to signing the agree-
ment, that the waiver provision would not be enforced absent fraud.114
105. MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 10. R
106. See, e.g., In re Reggie Packing Co., 671 F. Supp. 571, 573 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (“The courts are
sharply divided as to which party should bear the burden of proving knowing and voluntary
consent. . . . This court, however, need not decide this difficult issue.”).
107. Although this Article focuses on whether a court assigns the burden of proof to the
opponent or the proponent of a jury-trial waiver, there also exists an issue of what the standard
of proof is. See Bonfield v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589, 595 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(“No decision appears to have touched on the required standard of proof — whether by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence or something greater.”).
108. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977)
109. See Chuang, supra note 31, at 217 (providing a thorough, albeit slightly outdated, analysis R
of the burden of proof issue) (“Those courts that have resolved the burden of proof question
merely follow the pronouncements of Hendrix . . . without thorough analysis.”).
110. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985)
111. Id. at 754.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 755.
114. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 18  5-JAN-18 15:07
18 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1
The K.M.C. court’s discussion of the general standard governing
jury-trial waivers is unsurprising.  The court adopted the “knowing
and voluntary” standard115 and then proceeded to discuss the burden
of proof issue.  The court noted that the Hendrix standard relies only
on objective circumstances and not on alleged oral representations.116
Irving argued, and the court agreed, that admitting the statement of
K.M.C.’s president would force Irving to shoulder “the impossible
burden of proving or rebutting the subjective understanding of the
party seeking to invalidate the waiver of a constitutional right.”117
The court then reasoned:
However, the explanation of the clause allegedly given by Irving’s
representative to Butler of K.M.C. is no less an “objective circum-
stance” than whether or not the parties bargained over a particular
provision.  In none of the cited cases were oral representations vary-
ing the express language of the contractual waiver alleged.  This
case is not like Global Industries and Mountain Village, in which the
party seeking to escape the waiver provision claimed that it did not
intend or understand that in signing the contract there at issue it
was waiving jury trial or some other right, and the court regarded
that allegation as insufficient to overcome an inference from the ob-
jective circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract that
the waiver was in fact knowing and voluntary.118
Thus, the court departed from standard practice and held that the bur-
den of proof should fall on the opponent of a jury-trial waiver.119  Spe-
cifically, the opponent of a jury-trial waiver is required to prove that
the waiver was not made knowingly and voluntarily.120
No other circuit has followed K.M.C.’s reasoning.121  Although the
rationale behind the burden issue is questionable, other circuits have
continued to follow the traditional stance that the burden falls upon
the proponent of enforcing the jury-trail waiver clause.122  Further,
115. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 756.
116. Id. at 757.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 758.
120. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 758.
121. See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 10 (listing cases). R
122. See Chuang, supra note 31, at 215–18.  Chester Chuang argues: R
As support for its “presumption” the Hendrix court merely cited to Aetna Insurance
Co. v. Kennedy.  But while the Supreme Court did state in Aetna that ‘as the right of
jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver,’
Aetna involved a jury waiver during litigation and not a pre-dispute contractual jury
waiver . . . . [T]his is an important distinction that makes it difficult to analogize the
reasoning in Aetna to cases  involving pre-dispute contractual jury waivers.
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some courts have specifically declined to address the burden issue,
while other courts have broken from the Hendrix mold entirely.123
C. Treating Jury-Trial Waivers as Arbitration Agreements
The most recent and perhaps most controversial standard for en-
forcing a jury-trial waiver likens the waiver to arbitration agreements.
In 2007, the Seventh Circuit introduced the idea in IFC Credit Corp. v.
United Business and Industrial Federal Credit Union.124  While the
case represents a significant departure from the traditional standard,
the rationale for this departure is reasonable.
In IFC, NorVergence sold telecommunications equipment to sev-
eral contractors.125  However, because the equipment had none of the
advertised benefits many contractors stopped making payments.126
After NorVergence folded, IFC Credit Corp. brought suit seeking to
enforce the contracts against United Business and Industrial Federal
Credit Union.127  The equipment sales contract contained a jury-trial
waiver, which the district court deemed invalid.128  IFC then
appealed.129
Judge Easterbrook writing for the Seventh Circuit, began by stating
that contracts for the sale or rental of equipment are governed by the
Uniform Commercial Code.130  Terms in form contracts are routinely
enforced, save for a “battle of forms” or if the term is deemed “uncon-
scionable.”131  Citing general contract law under the UCC, Judge Eas-
terbrook stated there was nothing ambiguous about the bench-trial
clause within the contract.132
Judge Easterbrook found the Hendrix standard for determining the
validity of a jury-trial waiver was not persuasive, citing both Hendrix
and K.M.C.133  He reasoned that if a contract is silent on the issue of
jury trials, then Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 governs.134  Rule
123. See, e.g., Hulsey v. West, 966 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1992); Bakrac, Inc. v. Villager
Franchise Sys., 164 F. App’x 820, 823 (11th Cir. 2006) (Unpublished table decision).
124. IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989 (7th Cir.
2008).




129. IFC, 512 F.3d at 991.
130. Id. at 992.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 993.
134. IFC, 512 F.3d at 993.
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38 states that a jury trial can be waived by mere omission of a jury
demand within the complaint.135  Specifically, the court stated:
Omissions may occur by accident or lack of foresight.  If accidental
forfeitures can blot out any right to a jury trial—for no one argues
that Rule 38 is unconstitutional—then there is no federal rule that
bench-trial agreements must be attended by extra negotiation or de-
pend on evidence of voluntariness beyond what is required to make
the rest of the contract legally effective.136
A jury trial can be waived easily through procedure.  Why then do
courts hold these potential waivers in such low regard?  The court in
IFC recognized this inconsistency, citing two other circuits that have
also held bench-trial clauses are no less valid than the underlying con-
tract in which they appear.137
After rejecting the Hendrix “knowing and voluntary” standard, the
court addressed arbitration agreements.  In the context of jury-trial
waivers, the court stated:
Consider an agreement to arbitrate, which surrenders not only a
jury trial but also the right to any judicial forum.  Courts do not
impose special negotiation requirements on arbitration clauses in
form contracts.  So too with forum-selection clauses; parties may
agree to a forum in another nation, where juries are unknown, but
this does not make forum-selection clauses suspect.  Even confes-
sion-of-judgment clauses in cognovit notes are enforceable.  Agree-
ment to a bench trial cannot logically be treated less favorably than
agreement to confess judgment, or arbitrate, or litigate in a forum
that will not use a jury.138
Thus, the court remanded the case.139
135. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) (“A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly
served and filed. A proper demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent.”).
136. IFC, 512 F.3d at 993.
137. Id. at 994 (citing Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986)); Telum,
Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837–38 (10th Cir. 1988).  Note that while IFC
cites these cases as courts which hold “that an agreement to resolve a dispute in a bench trial is
no less valid than the rest of the contract in which the clause appears,” the court then proceeds
to recognize the inconsistency in these holdings.  Specifically, the court noted that:
Although both Leasing Service and Telum hold bench-trial agreements valid as compo-
nents of otherwise-valid contracts, they also state (inconsistently, it seems to us) that an
agreement to resolve a dispute by a bench trial must be assessed by the standards of
‘waiver.’ Moreover, National Equipment, K.M.C., Leasing Service, and Telum all ap-
proach the inquiry on the assumption (which the parties to those cases apparently did
not contest) that federal law governs the validity of such a clause, even when state law
applies to the substance of the parties’ dispute. None of the four decisions mentions or
attempts to justify the disparate treatment of bench-trial and arbitration agreements, or
the oddity of applying a waiver standard to a contract when Rule 38 does not use a
waiver approach once the case gets to court.
Id.
138. Id. (internal citations omitted).
139. Id.  In resolving the fraud in the factum defense, the court states:
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision in IFC was controversial and no
other court has adopted its reasoning.140  However, the issue of jury-
trial waivers rarely reaches the appellate level.  In fact, the IFC court
was the first appellate court to discuss jury-trial waivers since 1986
when K.M.C. was decided.141
The IFC court recognized the inconsistent application of the Hen-
drix standard.142  A plaintiff can easily waive the right to a jury trial
through omission.  Even when the party is represented by an attorney
this waiver is subject to a much lower bar than contractual jury-trial
waivers.  To the IFC court, this disparate treatment between the two
styles of waiver is unjustified.143  While IFC accurately depicted the
problems inherent in the Hendrix standard, the court’s solution leaves
much to be desired.
III. A NOVEL STANDARD FOR ADDRESSING CONTRACTUAL JURY-
TRIAL WAIVERS.
A. Problems with Current Standards
Circuit courts seldom address issues related to the enforceability of
jury-trial waivers.  However, the current standards applied by federal
courts each have flaws.  If a new rationale is to be adopted, it must
address and resolve the problems with both the Hendrix and IFC
standards.
i. Hendrix’s Shaky Foundation
IFC discussed many problems with the Hendrix standard and the
cases that followed it.144  Nevertheless, courts have blindly cited Hen-
If the judge determines before trial that the contract is void, and that the jury waiver
falls with it, then there is nothing to be tried to a jury. If the facts leave a material
dispute requiring resolution by a trier of fact—here IFC maintains that the Credit
Union knew full well exactly what it was signing, and that its defense of fraud in the
factum is just a misnamed defense of fraud in the inducement—then the jury-waiver
clause might be applied to determine whether a judge or a jury makes the critical
decision.
Id.
140. See, e.g., Crescent Re 1s. Litig. Tr. by & ex rel. Bensimon v. Duke Energy Corp., No. A-
12-CA-009-SS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62676, at *21 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 2013) (declining to follow
IFC).
141. David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Agreements, 57
UCLA L. REV. 605, 642 (2010).
142. 512 F.3d at 993.
143. Id. at 994.
144. Id. at 992–94.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 22  5-JAN-18 15:07
22 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1
drix for decades.145  The “knowing and voluntary” standard outlined
in Hendrix was not adequately supported by precedent.  In fact, none
of the cases cited by Hendrix involved contractual jury-trial waivers.
When the Hendrix court stated categorically that “[i]t is elementary
that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury is fundamental and that
its protection can only be relinquished knowingly and intentionally,”
the court cited two cases: Johnson v. Zerbst146 and Heyman v. Kline.147
The jury-trial waiver in Hendrix was made in a civil contract, without
anticipating litigation. Johnson v. Zerbst was a criminal case.  Courts
have long applied higher consent standards to waiving constitutional
rights in criminal cases.148 Heyman v. Kline involved an attorney’s
oral waiver during a pretrial conference, as distinguished from a pre-
dispute contractual waiver.149  The Hendrix court did not acknowl-
edge the important differences between these two cases and the issue
it was addressing.
The Hendrix court compared its holding to the Supreme Court’s
decision in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent.150  In Szuk-
hent, the Court upheld a contractual waiver of personal service.151
However, the Hendrix court, referencing Szukhent, noted that “[t]he
right to a jury trial, however, is far more fundamental than the right to
personal service, and cannot be waived absent a showing that its relin-
quishment is knowing and intentional.”152  Yet, the Hendrix court is
incorrect in this regard.  Waiver of personal service is equivalent to a
waiver of personal jurisdiction, which is a due process right.153  Al-
though the court mentioned that the rights were comparable, Hendrix
did not provide any authority or reasoning as to why the Seventh
145. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832–33 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Hen-
drix with little analysis of the case).
146. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
147. 456 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1972); Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d
Cir. 1977).
148. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 (“A waiver [of right to counsel] is ordinarily an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”).
149. Kline, 456 F.2d at 123. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Tr. Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 n.4 (6th Cir.
1985) (discussing the “significant distinction to be drawn” between pre-dispute waivers and
waivers made after litigation has commenced); Ware, supra note 21, at 203 (“[A]n oral waiver R
during litigation [is] an inapt analogue to a jury-waiver clause found in a contract.”).
150. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258; Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
151. Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 312.
152. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258 n.1.
153. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1074 (2002) (“The decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that the requirement of
reasonable notice must be regarded as part of the constitutional due process limitations on the
jurisdiction of a state or federal court.”); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 180
(1972) (“The due process rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment are subject to
waiver.”).
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Amendment right to a jury trial should be subject to a different stan-
dard than Fifth Amendment due process rights.  As Professor Ware
points out, “Hendrix was already out of step with the Supreme Court
when it was decided in 1977, and it is now farther out of step with a
modern Supreme Court. . . . Thus, the case for overruling the Hendrix
court’s knowing-consent requirement is strong.”154
ii. The “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard as an Absolute Bar
The “knowing and voluntary” standard has been subject to addi-
tional criticism.  For example, critics have argued that the “knowing
and voluntary” standard for contractual jury-trial waivers is often an
absolute bar, since an unsophisticated party is inherently unable to
make an informed decision prior to the necessity of trial.155  To that
effect, one author argues:
Although courts generally will not invalidate a contract based on
insufficient consideration, when an unsophisticated entity enters
into a contract where a right is waived prior to the occurrence of an
event that gives rise to the need to exercise the right, the value of
that right is indeterminable.  For an individual who does not plan to
use the right to a jury trial, the right may not seem valuable at all.
Then a dispute between the parties arises.  Suddenly the right to a
jury trial becomes very valuable, yet has been waived prior to the
time for exercising the right, often without consideration.  The only
explanation for entering these contracts is due to lack of meaningful
choice, a form of coercion, or lack of knowledge, either of which
should defeat enforcement of the contract.156
This argument is bolstered by certain courts’ near-outright refusal to
uphold jury-trial waivers.  For example, the court in Luis Acosta Inc.
v. Citibank157 refused to enforce a jury-trial waiver even after recog-
nizing that the opponent of the waiver was a “shrewd and experienced
businessman.”  The court went on to state that the proponent “pro-
vided no evidence whatsoever as to the parties’ specific negotiations
over the waiver, the conspicuousness of the provision, nor the parties’
relative bargaining power.”158  This searching application of the
“knowing and voluntary” standard shows that courts can find contrac-
tual jury-trial waivers unenforceable in any setting, even when sophis-
ticated parties are involved.
154. Ware, supra note 21, at 203 (arguing generally that the law of contractual jury-trial waiv- R
ers should be treated similarly to arbitration clauses).
155. E.g., Wayne Klomp, Note, Harmonizing the Law in Waiver of Fundamental Rights: Jury
Waiver Provisions in Contracts, 6 NEV. L. J. 545 (2005).
156. Id. at 567.
157. 920 F. Supp. 15 (D.P.R. 1996).
158. Id. at 18–19.
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Further, representation by counsel in some cases can be a disposi-
tive factor in whether a court chooses to enforce a jury-trial waiver.159
Courts regularly inquire as to whether the party opposing the waiver
was represented by counsel at the time the agreement containing the
waiver was signed.160  In the context of an employment contract or
employee severance agreement, this factor can be an absolute bar to
the waiver’s validity.  Large corporations and other sophisticated par-
ties will often retain attorneys to review contracts before signing.161
Yet a new hire, or recently fired employee will not usually retain an
attorney to review a contract.  So, when courts look to whether a party
opposing a jury-trial waiver is represented by counsel, they are imply-
ing that an unsophisticated party is entirely unable to, on their own,
waive a constitutional right.  Thus, the “knowing and voluntary” stan-
dard often bars enforcement of contractual jury-trial waivers against
unrepresented parties. Although application of the “knowing and vol-
untary” standard often protects the Seventh Amendment rights of
parties, there is nevertheless a strong policy argument against the use
of this standard, which will be discussed later in this Article.
iii. Arbitration and the Seventh Amendment
As discussed in Part I(d) of this Article, companies have signaled an
increasing reliance on jury-trial waivers.  The purpose of the FAA was
to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agree-
ments that had existed at English common law and had been adopted
by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the
same footing as other contracts.”162  If a court wishes to treat employ-
ment contracts and other more general contracts equitably, then reli-
ance on an arbitration-clause standard is misplaced.
159. See Green v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-01997-ORL-22DAB, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145652, at *14 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 2010) (stating how an employee’s right to
seek legal counsel before signing a contract can show a lack of disparity in bargaining power);
Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (declining to enforce a
jury-trial waiver because counsel was unable to review the contract before the party signed it);
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Smith, 826 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D.R.I. 1993) (enforcing a jury-trial waiver when
parties were represented by counsel, a factor “which courts have considered important in decid-
ing to enforce jury waiver clauses”).
160. Allyn v. W. United Life Assur. Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1252 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (noting
that courts often consider whether a party was represented by counsel when determining
whether a jury-trial waiver was knowing and voluntary).
161. See, e.g., Bear, Stearns Funding, Inc. v. Interface Grp.-Nev., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82557, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2007) (discussing a jury-trial waiver between to corporate par-
ties, and their use of a “squad” of attorneys to write and review the waiver).
162. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
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Furthermore, Congress has considered amending the FAA to limit
its applicability.  On April 29, 2015, the House and Senate simultane-
ously introduced the “Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015.”163  The pro-
posed bill states that “no predispute arbitration agreement shall be
valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment dis-
pute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.”164
Similar bills were introduced in 2011, 2009, and 2007.165  If the legisla-
tion passes employers will no longer be able to rely on arbitration
clauses, but rather, will have to use jury-trial waivers to guard against
the risks of a trial by jury.  Thus, the IFC standard of interpreting
contractual jury-trial waivers under the FAA would no longer be ap-
plicable in the contexts mentioned in the proposed legislation.
The underlying procedural differences between contractual jury-
trial waivers and arbitration clauses make interpreting the clauses
under the same standard problematic.  If a jury-trial waiver is en-
forced, the ensuing bench trial is still subject to appellate review and
oversight.166  Yet if an arbitration clause is upheld, the arbitration pro-
ceeding is shrouded in secrecy and is not subject to same level of judi-
cial scrutiny.167  Because arbitration clauses require parties to avoid a
trial court altogether, they also limit the parties’ avenues for remedy-
ing an unfair result.168
Additionally, IFC’s analogy to arbitration clauses is based on a false
equivalence with the Seventh Amendment.  If a binding arbitration
clause is held to be valid, the parties are no longer entitled to an Arti-
cle III forum at all.169  Thus, arbitration clauses cannot be an apt anal-
ogy to a waiver of the Seventh Amendment, because while arbitration
clauses waive the right to an Article III forum altogether, a jury-trial
waiver merely affects the identity of the trier of fact.  Furthermore, in
non-Article III forums, the Seventh Amendment “simply does not ap-
163. S. 1133, 114th Cong. § 1 (2015); H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. § 1 (2015).
164. Id.
165. S. 987, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011); H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009); S. 1782, 110th Cong.
§ 4 (2007).
166. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex. 2004).  The court opined:
[I]f parties are willing to agree to a non-jury trial, we think it preferable to enforce that
agreement rather than leave them with arbitration as their only enforceable option.  By
agreeing to arbitration, parties waive not only their right to trial by jury but their right
to appeal, whereas by agreeing to waive only the former right, they take advantage of
the reduced expense and delay of a bench trial, avoid the expense of arbitration, and
retain their right to appeal.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Geldermann, Inc. v. CFTC, 836 F.2d 310, 323–24 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Because we hold
that Geldermann is not entitled to an Article III forum, the Seventh Amendment is not
implicated.”).
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ply.”170  It therefore seems dubious that a proceeding not constrained
by the Seventh Amendment, could in fact be instructive as to how
waiver of that method should be adjudicated in an Article III forum.
Only a right that stems from Article III of the Constitution can serve
as an accurate analogy for jury-trial waivers.  To enforce jury-trial
waivers through a standard created to govern non-Article III forums,
would logically result in the Seventh Amendment being ignored in its
entirety. For these reasons, one must judge arbitration proceedings,
and the enforcement of clauses which facilitate their use, by a differ-
ent standard than waivers of Seventh Amendment rights. Given these
criticisms, the need for a fair, efficient, and uniform solution arises.
Ergo, this Article proposes that courts deciding whether to enforce
jury-trial waivers should eschew both the Hendrix and IFC standards,
instead treating jury-trial waivers as though they were forum-selection
clauses.
B. The “Forum Selection” Standard
Arbitration clauses not only waive a party’s right to a jury trial, they
waive a party’s right to a trial. The underlying issues must then be
adjudicated in a non-Article III forum.  Conversely, a valid jury-trial
waiver allows the case be tried in court, subject to Due Process and
the Seventh Amendment.  When the waiver at issue is a party’s Sev-
enth Amendment rights, a more apt comparison would be to the fo-
rum-selection clause, rather than an arbitration agreement.
Forum-selection clauses, like arbitration agreements and jury-trial
waivers, constrain parties’ rights in future disputes.  Forum-selection
clauses also implicate waivers of parties’ constitutional rights.171  Con-
sider, for example, a forum-selection clause that provides the
following:
All disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection
with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and
before a Court located in India, to the exclusion of the Courts of
any other country.
When the available forum is constrained to a foreign country, there
may not be a right to a jury trial.172  Despite this disconnect, American
170. Id.
171. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (noting that the en-
forcement of freely negotiated forum-selection provisions “does not offend due process” when
the provisions are neither unreasonable nor unjust); infra note 173 and accompanying text (ex- R
plaining how forum-selection clauses can be a waiver of Seventh Amendment rights).
172. See, e.g., K.M. Nanavati vs. State of Maharashtra, 1962 AIR 605 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 567,
India (disallowing a jury trial, citing a doubt that common people could come to independent
and objective legal determination).
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courts have readily enforced these types of forum-selection clauses,
which effectively waive those parties’ Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial.173
In addition, the language of Supreme Court decisions regarding fo-
rum-selection clauses is readily adaptable to jury-trial waivers.  In fact,
these decisions may implicitly allow a more lenient standard for en-
forcing jury-trial waivers.  In contrast, the Supreme Court never hesi-
tates to distinguish arbitration agreements from other form contracts.
In Gilmer, the Court stated that “[a]lthough all statutory claims may
not be appropriate for arbitration, having made the bargain to arbi-
trate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced
an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue.”174  Here, the Court explicitly referenced the manner
in which arbitration agreements are to be governed, as intended by
Congress in the FAA.175
There is no similar language in forum-selection cases.  The principal
case addressing forum-selection clauses is Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute.176  The Court required the plaintiffs, who were from Wash-
ington state, to sue in Florida due to a forum-selection clause within a
form contract.177  The Court then proceeded to enforce the contract
using standards of consent from contract law, with no mention of the
“knowing and voluntary” standard.
The Court’s rationale in Carnival Cruises shows that jury-trial waiv-
ers should be construed similar to forum-selection clauses.  The Court
listed three reasons as to why the form contract at issue was
permissible:
173. See, e.g., Interamerican Trade Corp. v. Companhia Fabricadora De Pecas, 973 F.2d 487
(6th Cir. 1992) (where the forum in question was Brazil); Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch Mas-
chinen, 972 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1992) (where the forum in question was Germany); Spradlin v.
Lear Siegler Mgt. Servs. Co., Inc., 926 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1991) (where the forum in question was
Saudi Arabia).
174. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
175. Id. at 24 (“[The FAA’s] purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbi-
tration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American
courts”).
176. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).  Although Carnival Cruise has been preempted by Congress in the
context of passenger cruise tickets, this does not affect the Court’s reasoning in the case, and this
Article’s discussion of the case in the context of constitutional waivers.  46 U.S.C. app.
§ 183c(a)(2) (2000).
177. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 587–88.  Note that Carnival Cruises was an admiralty case,
and no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial has been established in admiralty. See Waring v.
Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 460 (1847) (holding that the Seventh Amendment does not give a
right to a jury trial in admiralty cases).
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First, a cruise line has a special interest in limiting the fora in which
it potentially could be subject to suit.  Because a cruise ship typically
carries passengers from many locales, it is not unlikely that a mishap
on a cruise could subject the cruise line to litigation in several differ-
ent fora.  Additionally, a clause establishing ex ante the forum for
dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling any confusion
about where suits arising from the contract must be brought and
defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions
to determine the correct forum and conserving judicial resources
that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those motions. Finally,
it stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing
a forum clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of
reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by
limiting the fora in which it may be sued.178
In the context of a jury-trial waiver within an employment contract,
the Court’s justifications are equally relevant.  An employer has a spe-
cial interest in ensuring that disputes are adjudicated through a bench
trial.  Further, a jury-trial waiver similarly contains the salutary effect
of “sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions . . . and
conserving judicial resources that otherwise would be devoted” to de-
ciding issues of who will act as fact-finder.179  Finally, if an employer is
forced to try a case before a jury, it must incur increased risk and
expense. It stands to reason then, that employees who agree to con-
tracts containing a jury-trial waiver may benefit in the form of in-
creased salary or benefits reflecting the savings that the employer
enjoys by limiting the method by which it may be sued.
Enforcing jury-trial waivers similarly to forum-selection clauses may
result in a party waiving its Seventh Amendment rights through a
form contract.  Yet, the Supreme Court has allowed a waiver of consti-
tutional rights in other form contracts.  One example of this is in
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.180 Mitchell was a property deprivation
case, involving a debtor’s default on a conditional sales contract.181
State statute allowed the creditor to obtain a writ instructing the sher-
iff or constable to take possession of the goods from the debtor.182
The Court rejected Mitchell’s argument that due process entitled him
to a hearing before the goods were seized.183  The Court treated the
contract granting a lien as a waiver of the due process right to a pre-
deprivation hearing, without regard for whether the waiver was
178. Id. at 593–94 (internal citations omitted).
179. Id. at 593–94 (internal citations omitted).
180. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
181. Id. at 601–02.
182. Id. at 621–23.
183. Id. at 607.
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“knowing and voluntary.”  The Mitchell Court stated that but for the
contract granting a lien, the due process result would have been differ-
ent. Mitchell, which remains good law,184 involved a party’s due pro-
cess rights.  Jury-trial waivers involve the Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial.  But courts citing Hendrix have so far been unable to
provide any authority for why the standard for a constitutional waiver
should differ based on the amendment it arises out of.
In effect, federal courts and Congress—the authors of the FAA—
have created disparity between the enforcement of different constitu-
tional waivers.  As this Article has noted, arbitration clauses waive the
right to a jury trial but are favored in courts due to the FAA.185  Jury-
trial waivers under Hendrix are subject to a “knowing and voluntary”
standard, despite the standard’s creation from a lack of authority and
an inaccurate application of precedent.186  Yet forum-selection clauses
are both favored in courts and free from the constraints of a governing
statute.187  Accordingly, courts should apply the standard the Supreme
Court has created for the enforcement of forum-selection clauses to
jury-trial waivers.
C. Practical Implementation of the “Forum Selection” Standard
Adopting the “forum selection” standard for enforcing jury-trial
waivers would be straightforward.  First, the Supreme Court in The
Bremen held that forum-selection clauses are prima facie valid and
should not be set aside unless the party challenging enforcement can
show that it is “unreasonable” under the circumstances.188  Similarly, a
jury-trial waiver agreement should be prima facie valid and subject to
the same “reasonableness” standard.
Second, in determining whether a jury-trial waiver is “unreasona-
ble” a court using the “forum selection” standard should use a test
184. See, e.g., Quinata v. Nishimura, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121191, at *14 (D. Haw. Aug. 26,
2013); Blackhorse Oilfield Specialty & Supply, LLC v. LK Trading, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71376, at *13 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2014) (citing Mitchell).
185. Supra Part I.B.
186. Supra Part III.A.
187. Supra Part I.C.
188. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1971).  The court stated:
[O]ther courts are tending to adopt a more hospitable attitude toward forum-selection
clauses. This view . . . is that such clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced
unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be “unreasonable” under the
circumstances. We believe this is the correct doctrine to be followed.
Id.
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inspired by The Bremen.189  Under this test, a jury-trial waiver would
be unreasonable if (1) its inclusion within the underlying contract was
the result of fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining
power190 or (2) enforcement of the clause would contravene a strong
public policy.191
Third, under the proposed “forum selection” standard parties
would be limited in how they can oppose a jury-trial waiver.  How-
ever, they are no more limited than a party opposing a forum-selec-
tion clause within a form contract.  Given the preference for
arbitration clauses within federal courts, parties opposing a jury-trial
waiver under this standard will have a higher probability of invalidat-
ing the clause than under the IFC standard.192
“Agreement to a bench trial cannot logically be treated less favora-
bly than agreement to confess judgment, or arbitrate, or litigate in a
forum that will not use a jury.”193  It is for this reason that jury-trial
waivers are best governed by the standards used in forum-selection
clauses.  The “forum selection” standard not only side-steps the criti-
cisms in Hendrix, but it is also free from the criticisms of an arbitra-
tion-clause standard, and is thus correct where the IFC court’s
reasoning fails.
Uniformity in jury-trial waiver standards is necessary for judicial ef-
ficiency.  Many critics recognize that a lenient standard has the poten-
tial for greater judicial efficiency.  These critics, however, argue the
Hendrix standard is desirable because it preserves Seventh Amend-
ment rights and constrains the power of federal judges.194  While ad-
dressing the reasoning behind the IFC court’s decision, one critic
argued:
When courts make [the analogy between jury trial waivers and arbi-
tration agreements], they disregard the judge’s relationship to the
jury and the purposes of the Seventh Amendment.  The FAA
189. The test given here is inspired by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which
outlined the requirements for enforcement given in The Bremen.  Argueta v. Banco Mexicano,
S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 325 (9th Cir. 1996).
190. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12–13 (“There are compelling reasons why a freely negotiated
private international agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargain-
ing power, such as that involved here, should be given full effect.”).
191. Id. at 15 (“A contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforce-
ment would contravene a strong public policy . . . whether declared by statute or by judicial
decision.”).
192. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2 (1984) (explaining how arbitration clauses
are favored in federal court).
193. IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir.
2008).
194. Deborah J. Matties, Note, A Case for Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting Contractual
Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431, 463–64 (1997).
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removes cases from federal court completely, decreasing the power
of federal judges.  In contrast, enforcement of contractual jury waiv-
ers increases the power of federal judges because they can decide
both issues of law and issues of fact.  Thus, analogy to the FAA is
inapposite because arbitration decreases judges’ power, which is not
contrary to the purposes of the Seventh Amendment, whereas con-
tractual jury waivers increase judges’ power, which is contrary to the
purposes of the Seventh Amendment.  Because judges are indepen-
dent and have few checks upon their daily powers, they should not
be allowed to remove one of those few checks—the jury—without
strict requirements.195
This criticism is an ineffective argument against the “forum selection”
standard.  First, the argument does not address forum-selection
clauses, which allow a judge to decide issues of both law and fact, the
result the critic finds undesirable in the jury-trial waiver context.196
Second, while providing a more lenient standard for jury-trial waivers
may remove the jury from a case more often, it is inaccurate to state
that judges interpreting this issue have few checks on their power.  Ju-
dicial review of arbitration is extremely limited,197 but jury-trial
waiver agreements are ripe for appeal.198  In addition, while courts
have historically been extremely hesitant to overturn jury fact-find-
ing,199 appellate courts readily review issues of fact in a bench trial for
clear error.200
Further, the “forum selection” standard will bring uniformity and
efficiency to the law of jury-trial waivers.  When courts, employers,
and employees do not know the proper standard by which to treat
these waivers, the following generally takes place.  After the parties
introduce evidence of the jury-trial waiver and follow the proper pro-
cedure for objecting, the court will require briefs on the issue.201  The
195. Id. at 464.
196. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text (illustrating how a forum-selection clause
can be a waiver of constitutional rights).
197. See LeRoy, supra note 28, at 777–80 (appellate review of arbitration is limited to the R
award of damages and not to misapplication of the facts or law).
198. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex. 2004) (explaining how a
bench trial retains the right to appeal, whereas arbitration proceedings do not).
199. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987).  In Tanner, the Supreme
Court declined to overturn a jury verdict, even when the jury had been consuming copious
amounts of marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol during the trial and deliberations.  The Court notes
that “long-recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations
from intrusive inquiry.” Id.
200. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (“In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. . . . Find-
ings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.”).
201. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text (outlining the typical procedure for disputing
the validity of a jury-trial waiver).
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issue may then even necessitate argument before the court.  The court
will then be forced to wade through a sea of inconsistent and confus-
ing opinions.  Far too much time and money is spent on deciding this
issue and efficiency is lost, which was one of the main reasons the
parties opted to bypass a jury trial.
Uniformity in the “forum selection” standard ensures that all con-
tracting parties—whether the agreement in question is between em-
ployer and employee, business and customer, or between two
sophisticated corporations—are treated equitably.  If the Hendrix
standard for governing jury-trial waivers continues to be applied in
federal courts, then a weak, “unsophisticated” consumer is incapable
of alienating his right to adjudication.  The consumer may enter into a
contract that contains a jury-trial waiver, but in courts that apply the
Hendrix standard it will be impossible to enforce that waiver.202  This
standard is inconsistent with Federal Rule 38, which allows the same
party to waive their right to a jury trial by omission or inaction.203  If
Rule 38 allows a party to waive that right inadvertently—for no court
argues that Rule 38 is unconstitutional204— it does not make sense for
the standard for waiver before Rule 38 applies, to be more stringent
than Rule 38 itself.
This uniformity and efficiency will ensure the purpose of jury-trial
waivers is met: economical and predictable dispute resolution.  This is
preferable for both parties to a contract. The “forum-selection” stan-
dard of enforcing jury-trial waivers is not only simple for courts to
follow, but easy for parties to interpret and predict results.
CONCLUSION
When judges are faced with reviewing a contractual jury-trial
waiver, the issue is never straightforward.  Even when a district court
has the guidance of its appellate court, interpretation of the current
standards can lead to confusion and misapplication of law.  This leads
to inconsistency and variation between courts, which in turn causes
the litigating parties additional headache and expense.  Therefore,
federal courts need a clear, concise, and efficient standard to judge the
validity of jury-trial waivers.
202. See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text (in support of the argument that the Hen-
drix standard presents an absolute bar to a party’s ability to waive their right to a jury trial).
203. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) (“A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served
and filed.”).
204. IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir.
2008).
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The benefits of the “forum selection” standard are clear.  The “fo-
rum selection” standard creates an avenue for easy enforcement of
jury-trial waivers—a result that arguably favors employers in potential
disputes.  Nevertheless, uniformity and efficiency undoubtedly benefit
both parties. The Hendrix standard stems from an inconsistent appli-
cation of prior law and can limit a party’s ability to contract.  Mean-
while, the IFC standard is limited by statute, the FAA, and cannot be
properly analogized to an issue arising under the Constitution.  The
“forum selection” standard is efficient, fair, sufficiently protective of
the Seventh Amendment, and unifies the inconsistency between dif-
ferent civil waivers of constitutional rights.
After all, contractual jury-trial waivers are simple in nature.  Al-
though the interpretation of such waivers is a long and complicated
process, the waivers themselves serve only one purpose: to ensure that
disputes between parties are litigated fairly, efficiently, and without
unnecessary expense.
The public views arbitration as a forum that results in decisionmak-
ing superior to that of a jury.205  In fact, over eighty percent of respon-
dents in one survey stated that arbitrators are equally or more fair
than juries.206  Unlike arbitrators, federal judges are reviewed for their
competence, integrity, and qualifications before assuming the role.  In
addition, these judges are subject to appellate review and risk being
overturned on any wrong decision.207 When an employment dispute is
litigated, a bench trial may be the ideal method of adjudication.  As
Justice O’Connor asserted, “[juries] are ordinary citizens whose deci-
sions can be shaped by influences impermissible in our system of jus-
tice.  In fact, they are much more susceptible to such influence than
judges.  Arbitrariness, caprice, passion, bias, and even malice can re-
place reasoned judgment and law as the basis for jury
decisionmaking.”208
The “forum-selection” standard for interpreting jury-trial waivers
can be adopted by federal courts seeking the best of both the Hendrix
205. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 458 (1988)
(evaluating the effectiveness and fairness of arbitration proceedings).
206. Id.  Thomas Stipanowich reports:
On the other hand, arbitrators compared favorably with juries and judges in perceived
decisionmaking capability. Almost 40% of those responding rated arbitrators as gener-
ally fairer than juries, and another 43% believed they were equally as fair.  Twenty-four
percent ranked arbitration below bench trial in terms of fairness, but an equal number
ranked it higher. The remaining half of the group rated the two equally fair.
Id.
207. LeRoy, supra note 28, at 777–80. R
208. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 474 (1993) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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and IFC standards.  Employers will, by any means necessary, continue
to avoid the jury trial.  By allowing the more lenient standard of inter-
preting jury-trial waivers, a court ensures that employers and employ-
ees are both allowed access to the judiciary, without overly limiting
the procedure within.
